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Abstract
In this paper we use pre existing language support for type modifiers and object capabilities to
enable a system for sound runtime verification of invariants. Our system guarantees that class
invariants hold for all objects involved in execution. Invariants are specified simply as methods
whose execution is statically guaranteed to be deterministic and not access any externally mutable
state. We automatically call such invariant methods only when objects are created or the state
they refer to may have been mutated. Our design restricts the range of expressible invariants
but improves upon the usability and performance of our system compared to prior work. In
addition, we soundly support mutation, dynamic dispatch, exceptions, and non determinism,
while requiring only a modest amount of annotation.
We present a case study showing that our system requires a lower annotation burden compared
to Spec#, and performs orders of magnitude less runtime invariant checks compared to the widely
used ‘visible state semantics’ protocols of D, Eiffel. We also formalise our approach and prove that
such pre existing type modifier and object capability support is sufficient to ensure its soundness.
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1 Introduction
Object oriented programming languages provide great flexibility through subtyping and
dynamic dispatch: they allow code to be adapted and specialised to behave differently in
different contexts. However this flexibility hampers code reasoning, since object behaviour is
usually nearly completely unrestricted. This is further complicated with the support OO
languages typically have for exceptions, memory mutation, and I/O.
Class invariants are an important concept when reasoning about software correctness.
They can be presented as documentation, checked as part of static verification, or, as we
do in this paper, monitored for violations using runtime verification. In our system, a class
specifies its invariant by defining a boolean method called invariant. We say that an
object’s invariant holds when its invariant method would return true. We do this, like
Dafny [44], to minimise special syntactic and type-system treatment of invariants, making
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them easier to understand for users. Whereas most other approaches treat invariants as a
special annotation with its own syntax.
An invariant protocol [72] specifies when invariants need to be checked, and when they
can be assumed; if such checks guarantee said assumptions, the protocol is sound. The two
main sound invariant protocols present in literature are visible state semantic [51] and the
Boogie/Pack-Unpack methodology [5]. The visible state semantics expect the invariants of
receivers to hold before and after every public method call, and after constructors. Invariants
are simply checked at all such points, thus this approach is obviously sound; however this
can be incredibly inefficient, even in simple cases. In contrast, the pack/unpack methodology
marks all objects as either packed or unpacked, where a packed object is one whose invariant
is expected to hold. In this approach, an object’s invariant is checked only by the pack
operation. In order for this to be sound, some form of aliasing and/or mutation control
is necessary. For example, Spec#, which follows the pack/unpack methodology, uses a
theorem prover, together with source code annotations. While Spec# can be used for full
static verification, it conveniently allows invariant checks to be performed at runtime, whilst
statically verifying aliasing, purity and other similar standard properties. This allows us to
closely compare our approach with Spec#.
Instead of using automated theorem proving, it is becoming more popular to verify aliasing
and immutability using a type system. For example, three languages: L42 [68, 67, 43, 35],
Pony [22, 23], and the language of Gordon et. al. [38] use Type Modifiers (TMs) and Object
Capabilities (OCs) to ensure safe and deterministic parallelism.1 While studying those
languages, we discovered an elegant way to enforce invariants.
We use the guarantees provided by these systems to ensure that that at all times, if an
object is usable in execution, its invariant holds. What this means is that if you can do
anything with an object, such as by using it as an argument/receiver of a method call, we
know that the invariant of it, and all objects reachable from it, holds. In order to achieve
this, we use TMs and OCs to restrict how the result of invariant methods may change, this
is done by restricting I/O as well as what state the invariant can refer to and what can
alias/mutate such state. We use these restrictions to reason as to when an object’s invariant
could have been violated, and when such object can next be used, we then inject a runtime
check between these two points. See Section 3 for the exact details of our invariant protocol.
Example
Here we show an example illustrating our system in action. Suppose we have a Cage class
which contains a Hamster; the Cage will move its Hamster along a path. We would like to
ensure that the Hamster does not deviate from the path. We can express this as the invariant
of Cage: the position of the Cage’s Hamster must be within the path (stored as a field of
Cage).
class Point { Double x; Double y; Point(Double x, Double y) {..}
@Override read method Bool equals(read Object that) {
return that instanceof Point &&
this.x == ((Point)that).x && this.y == ((Point)that).y; }
}
class Hamster {Point pos; //pos is imm by default
Hamster(Point pos) {..}
1 TMs are called reference capabilities in other works. We use the term TM here to not confuse them
with object capabilities, another technique we also use in this paper.
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}
class Cage {
capsule Hamster h;
List <Point > path; //path is imm by default
Cage(capsule Hamster h, List <Point > path) {..}
read method Bool invariant () {
return this.path.contains(this.h.pos); }
mut method Void move() {
Int index = 1 + this.path.indexOf(this.h.pos));
this.moveTo(this.path.get(index % this.path.size ())); }
mut method Void moveTo(Point p) { this.h.pos = p; }
}
Many verification approaches take advantage of the separation between primitive/value
types and objects, since the former are immutable and do not support reference equality.
However, our approach works in a pure OO setting without such a distinction. Hence we
write all type names in BoldTitleCase to underline this. Note: to save space, here and in
the rest of the paper we omit the bodies of constructors that simply initialise fields with
the values of constructor parameters, but we show their signature in order to show any
annotations.
We use the read annotation on equals to express that it does not modify either the
receiver or the parameter. In Cage we use the capsule annotation to ensure that the
Hamster’s reachable object graph (ROG) is fully under the control of the containing Cage.
We annotated the move and moveTo methods with mut, since they modify their receivers
ROG. The default annotation is always imm, thus Cage’s path field is a deeply immutable
list of Points. Our system performs runtime checks for the invariant at the end of Cage’s
constructor, moveTo method, and after any update to one of its fields. The moveTo method
is the only one that may (directly) break the Cage’s invariant. However, there is only a
single occurrence of this and it is used to read the h field. We use the guarantees of TMs
to ensure that no alias to this could be reachable from either h or the immutable Point
parameter. Thus, the potentially broken this object is not visible while the Hamster’s
position is updated. The invariant is checked at the end of the moveTo method, just before
this would become visible again. This technique loosely corresponds to an implicit pack
and unpack: we use this only to read the field value, then we work on its value while the
invariant of this is not known to hold, finally we check the invariant before allowing the
object to be used again.
Note: since only Cage has an invariant, only Cage has special restrictions, allowing the
code for Point and Hamster to be unremarkable. This is not the case in Spec#: all code
involved in verification needs to be designed with verification in mind [7].
Spec# Example
Here we show the previous example in Spec#, the system most similar to ours (see appendix
B for a more detailed discussion about this solution):
// Note: assume everything is ‘public ’
class Point { double x; double y; Point(double x, double y) {..}
[Pure] bool Equal(double x, double y) {
return x == this.x && y == this.y; }
}
class Hamster {[Peer]Point pos;
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Hamster ([ Captured]Point pos ){..}
}
class Cage {
[Rep] Hamster h; [Rep , ElementsRep] List <Point > path;
Cage([ Captured] Hamster h, [Captured] List <Point > path)
requires Owner.Same(Owner.ElementProxy(path), path); {
this.h = h; this.path = path; base (); }
invariant exists {int i in (0 : this.path.Count );
this.path[i].Equal(this.h.pos.x, this.h.pos.y) };
void Move() {
int i = 0;
while(i<path.Count && !path[i]. Equal(h.pos.x,h.pos.y)){i++;}
expose(this) {this.h.pos = this.path[i%this.path.Count ];}}
}
In both versions, we designed Point and Hamster in a general way, and not solely to be
used by classes with an invariant, in particular Point is not an immutable class. However,
doing this in Spec# proved difficult, in particular we were unable to override Object.Equals,
or even define a usable equals method that takes a Point, as such we could not call either
List<Point>.Contains or List<Point>.IndexOf.
Even with all of the above annotations, we still needed special care in creating Cages:
List <Point > pl = new List <Point >{new Point(0,0),new Point (0 ,1)};
Owner.AssignSame(pl, Owner.ElementProxy(pl));
Cage c = new Cage(new Hamster(new Point(0, 0)), pl);
Whereas with our system we can simply write:
List <Point > pl = List.of(new Point(0, 0), new Point(0, 1));
Cage c = new Cage(new Hamster(new Point(0, 0)), pl);
In Spec# we had to add 10 different annotations, of 8 different kinds; some of which
were quite involved. In comparison, our approach requires only 7 simple keywords, of 3
different kinds; however we needed to write a separate moveTo method, since we do not want
to burden our language with extra constructs such as Spec#’s expose.
Summary
We have fully implemented our protocol in L4223, we used this implementation to implement
and test an interactive GUI involving a class with an invariant. On a test case with 5 objects
with an invariant, our protocol performed only 77 invariant checks, whereas the visible state
semantic invariant protocols of D and Eiffel perform 53 and 14 million checks (respectively).
See Section 7 for an explanation of these result. We also compared with Spec#, whose
invariant protocol performs the same number of checks as ours, however the annotation
burden was almost 4 times higher than ours.
In this paper we argue that our protocol is not only more succinct than the pack/unpack
approach, but is also easier and safer to use. Moreover, our approach deals with more
scenarios than most prior work: we allow sound catching of invariant failures and also
2 A suitably anonymised, experimental version of L42, supporting the protocol described in this paper,
together with the full code of our case studies, is available at http://l42.is/EcoopArtifact.zip.
3 We also believe it would be easy to implement our protocol in Pony and Gordon et. al.’s language.
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carefully handle non deterministic operations like I/O. Section 2 explains the type modifier
and object capability support we use for this work. Section 3 explains the details of our
invariant protocol, and section 4 formalises a language enforcing this protocol. Sections 5 and
6, respectively, explain and motivate how our protocol can handle invariants over immutable
and encapsulated data. Section 7 presents our GUI case study and compares it against visible
state semantics and Spec#. Sections 8 and 9 provide related work and conclusions.
Appendix A provides a proof that our invariant protocol is sound. Appendices B and C
provide further case studies and comparisons against Spec#, D and Eiffel.
2 Type Modifiers and Object Capabilities
Reasoning about imperative object oriented (OO) programs is a non trivial task, made
particularly difficult by mutation, aliasing, dynamic dispatch, I/O, and exceptions. There
are many ways to perform such reasoning, here we use the type system to restrict, but
not prevent such behaviour in order to be able to soundly enforce invariants with runtime
verification (RV).
Type Modifiers (TMs)
TMs, as used in this paper, are a type system feature that allows reasoning about aliasing
and mutation. Recently a new design for them has emerged that radically improves their
usability; three different research languages are being independently developed relying on
this new design: the language of Gordon et. al. [38], Pony [22, 23], and L42 [68, 67, 43, 35].
These projects are quite large: several million lines of code are written in Gordon et. al.’s
language and are used by a large private Microsoft project; Pony and L42 have large libraries
and are active open source projects. In particular the TMs of these languages are used to
provide automatic and correct parallelism [38, 22, 23, 67].
While we focus on the specific TMs provided by L42, Pony, and Gordon et. al., type
modifiers are a well known language mechanism [75, 11, 61, 22, 35, 38] that allow statically
reasoning about mutability and aliasing properties of objects. With slightly different names
and semantics, the four most common modifiers for references to objects are:
Mutable (mut): the referenced object can be mutated, as in most imperative languages
without modifiers. If all types are mut, there is no restriction on aliasing/mutation.
Readonly (read): the referenced object cannot be mutated by such references, but there
may be mutable aliases to such object, thus mutation can still be observed.
Immutable (imm): the referenced object can never mutate. Like read references, one
cannot mutate through an imm reference, however imm references also guarantee that the
referenced object will not mutate through any other alias.
Encapsulated (capsule): everything in the reachable object graph (ROG) of a capsule
reference (including itself) is mutable only through that reference; however immutable
references can be freely shared across capsule boundaries.
TMs are different to field or variable modifiers like Java’s final: TMs apply to references,
whereas final applies to fields themselves. Unlike a variable/field of a read type, a final
variable/field cannot be reassigned, it always refers to the same object, however the vari-
able/field can still be used to mutate the referenced object. On the other hand, an object
cannot be mutated through a read reference, however a read variable can still be reassigned.4
4 In C, this is similar to the difference between A* const (like final) and const A* (like read), where
const A* const is like final read.
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Consider the following example usage of mut, imm, and read, where we can observe a
change in rp caused by a mutation inside mp.
mut Point mp = new Point(1, 2);
mp.x = 3; // ok
imm Point ip = new Point(1, 2);
//ip.x = 3; // type error
read Point rp = mp; // ok , read is a common supertype of imm/mut
//rp.x = 3; // type error
mp.x = 5; // ok , now we can observe rp.x == 5
ip = new Point(3, 5); // ok , ip is not final
There are several possible interpretations of the semantics of type modifiers. Here we
assume the full/deep meaning [79, 66]:
the objects in the ROG of an immutable object are immutable,
a mutable field accessed from a read reference produces a read reference,
no casting/promotion from read to mut is allowed.
There are many different existing techniques and type systems that handle the modifiers
above [79, 21, 39, 38, 68]. The main progress in the last few years is with the flexibility of such
type systems: where the programmer should use imm when representing immutable data and
mut nearly everywhere else. The system will be able to transparently promote/recover [38,
22, 68] the type modifiers, adapting them to their use context. To see a glimpse of this
flexibility, consider the following example:
mut Circle mc = new Circle(new Point(0, 0), 7);
capsule Circle cc = new Circle(new Point(0, 0), 7);
imm Circle ic = new Circle(new Point(0, 0), 7);
Here mc, cc, and ic are syntactically initialised with the same expression: new Circle(..).
The new expression returns a mut, so mc is obviously ok. Moreover, the expression does not
use any mut local variables, thus the flexible TM system allows the mut result to be promoted
to capsule, thus cc is ok. Additionally, a capsule can be implicitly converted to imm, thus
ic is also ok. We want to emphasise that this is not a special feature of new expressions: any
expression of a mut type that uses no free mut variables declared outside can be implicitly
promoted to capsule/imm.5 This is the main improvement on the flexibility of TMs in recent
literature [67, 68, 38, 22, 23]. Former work [16, 14, 40, 69, 2], which eventually enabled the
work of Gordon et. al., does not consider promotion and infers uniqueness/isolation/immut-
ability only when starting from references that have been tracked with restrictive annotations
along their whole lifetime. From a usability perspective, this improvement means that these
TMs are opt-in: a programmer can write large sections of code mindlessly using mut types
and be free to have rampant aliasing. Then, at a later stage, another programmer may still
be able to encapsulate those data structures into an imm or capsule reference.
The capsule modifier (sometimes called isolated/iso) is possibly the one whose details
differ the most in literature. Here we refer to the interpretation of [38], that introduced the
concept of recovery/promotion. This concept is the basis for L42, Pony, and Gordon et. al.’s
type systems [38, 67, 68, 67, 22, 23].
5 This requires some restrictions on read fields not discussed in detail for lack of space.
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The capsule/isolated fields of Gordon et. al. and Pony rely on destructive reads [38, 22]:
in order to read them, a new value (such as null) will be assigned to them. In contrast,
L42 [67, 68] does not require such destructive reads, thus capsule fields can be accessed
many times, and their content can be seen from outside; but only in controlled ways. Both
Gordon et. al. and Pony restrict how capsule local variables can be used by changing the
type they are seen as, however both allow the local variable to be ‘consumed’, allowing them
to be used as normal capsule/isolated expressions, at the cost of being unable to use the
variable again. L42 however uses a simpler approach where all accesses to capsule local
variables consume them: they are expressed using linear/affine types [13], thus they can only
be used once.
Exceptions
In most languages exceptions may be thrown at any point; combined with mutation this
complicates reasoning about the state of programs after exceptions are caught: if an exception
was thrown whilst mutating an object, what state is that object in? Does its invariant hold?
The concept of strong exception safety (SES) [1, 43] simplifies reasoning: if a try–catch
block caught an exception, the state visible before execution of the try block is unchanged,
and the exception object does not expose any object that was being mutated. L42 already
enforces SES for unchecked exceptions.6 L42 enforces SES using TMs in the following way:78
Code inside a try block capturing unchecked exceptions is typed as if all mut variables
declared outside of the block are read.
Only imm objects may be thrown as unchecked exceptions.
This strategy does not restrict throwing exceptions, but only catching unchecked ones. SES
allows us to soundly capture invariant failures as unchecked exceptions: the broken object is
guaranteed to be garbage collectable when the exception is captured. For the purposes of
soundly catching invariant failures, it would be sufficient to enforce SES only when capturing
exceptions caused by such failures.
Object Capabilities (OCs)
OCs, which L42, Pony, and Gordon et. al.’s work have, are a widely used [54, 60, 42]
programming style that allows associating resources with objects. When this style is respected,
code that does not possess an alias to such an object cannot use its associated resource. Here,
as in Gordon et. al.’s work, we use OCs to reason about determinism and I/O. To properly
enforce this, the OC style needs to be respected while implementing the primitives of the
standard library and when performing foreign function calls that could be non deterministic,
such as operations that read from files or generate random numbers. Such operations
would not be provided by static methods, but instead instance methods of classes whose
instantiation is kept under control.
For example, in Java, System.in is a capability object that provides access to the standard
input resource, however, as it is globally accessible it completely prevents reasoning about
determinism.
In contrast, if Java were to respect the object capability style, the main method could take
a System parameter, as in main(mut System s) {.. s.in.read() ..}. Calling methods
6 This is needed to support safe parallelism. Pony takes a more drastic approach and does not support
exceptions in the first place. We are not aware of how Gordon et. al. handles exceptions, however in
order for it to have sound unobservable parallelism it must have some restrictions.
7 Transactions are another way of enforcing strong exception safety, but they require specialized and
costly run time support.
8 A formal proof of why these restriction are sufficient is presented in the work of Lagorio [43].
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on that System instance would be the only way to perform I/O; moreover, the only System
instance would be the one created by the runtime system before calling main. This design
has been explored by Joe-E [32]. OCs are typically not part of the type system nor do
they require runtime checks or special support beyond that provided by a memory safe
language. However, since L42 allows user code to perform foreign calls without going through
a predefined standard library, its type system enforces the OC pattern over such calls:
Foreign methods (which have not been whitelisted as deterministic) and methods whose
names start with #$ are capability methods.
Constructors of classes declared as capability classes are also capability methods.
Capability methods can only be called by other capability-methods or mut/capsule
methods of capability classes.
In L42 there is no main method, rather it has several main expressions; such expressions
can also call capability methods, thus they can instantiate capability objects and pass
them around to the rest of the program.
L42 expects capability methods to be used mostly internally by capability classes, whereas
user code would call normal methods on already existing capability objects.
For the purposes of invariant checking, we only care about the effects that methods could
have on the running program and heap. As such, output methods (such as a print method)
can be whitelisted as ‘deterministic’, provided they do not affect program execution, such as
by non deterministically throwing I/O errors.
Purity
TMs and OCs together statically guarantee that any method with only read or imm parameters
(including the receiver) is pure; we define pure as being deterministic and not mutating
existing memory. Such methods are pure because:
the ROG of the parameters (including this) is only accessible as read (or imm), thus it
cannot be mutated9,
if a capability object is in the ROG of any of the arguments (including the receiver), then
it can only be accessed as read, preventing calling any non deterministic (capability)
methods,
no other preexisting objects are accessible (as L42 does not have global variables).10
3 Our Invariant Protocol
Our invariant protocol guarantees that the whole ROG of any object involved in execution
(formally, in a redex) is valid: if you can call methods on an object, calling invariant on it
is guaranteed to return true in a finite number of steps. However, calls to invariant that
are generated by our runtime monitoring (see below) can access the fields of a potentially
invalid this. This is necessary to allow for the invariant method to do its job: namely
distinguish between valid and invalid objects. However, as for any other method, calls to
invariant written explicitly by users are guaranteed to have a valid receiver.
9 This is even true in the concurrent environments of Pony and Gordon, since they ensure that no other
thread/actor has access to a mut/capsule alias of this. Thus, since such methods do not write to
memory accessible by another thread, nor read memory that could be mutated by another thread, they
are atomic.
10 If L42 did have static variables, getters and setters for them would be capability methods. Even
allowing unrestricted access to imm static variables would prevent reasoning over determinism, due to
the possibility of global variable updates; however constant/final globals of an imm type would not cause
such problems.
Isaac O. G., M. Servetto, and A. Potanin 23:9
For simplicity, in the following explanation and in our formalism we require receiv-
ers to always be specified explicitly, and require that the receivers of field accesses and
updates are always this; that is, all fields are instance private. We also do not allow
explicit constructor definitions, instead we assume constructors are of the standard form
C(T1x1,...,Tnxn) {this.f1=x1;...;this.fn=xn;}, where the fields of C are T1f1;...;Tnfn;.
This ensures that partially uninitialised (and likely invalid) objects are not passed around
or used. These restrictions only apply to our formalism; our code examples and the L42
implementation soundly relax these, see below for a discussion.
Invariants
We require that all classes contain a read method Bool invariant() {..}, if no invariant
method is present, a trivial one returning true will be assumed. As this method only takes
a read parameter (the receiver), we can be sure that it is pure 11, as discussed in Section
2. The bodies of invariant methods are limited in their usage of this: this can only be
used to access imm and capsule fields. This restriction ensures that an invalid this cannot
be passed around. We prevent accessing mut fields since their ROG could be changed by
unrelated code (see Section 5). Note that we do not require such fields to be final: when a
field is updated, we simply check the invariant of the receiver of the update.
Capsule mutators
In order to allow complex mutations of objects with invariants we introduce the notion of
capsule mutator. A capsule mutator can perform an arbitrarily complex mutation of the
ROG of a capsule field. We use TMs to ensure that the object containing the capsule field
is not usable whilst the fields ROG is mutated, and it’s invariant is checked immediately
afterwards.
Formally, capsule mutators are mut methods whose body accesses a capsule field men-
tioned in the invariant of the class containing the field. Capsule mutators must use this
exactly once in their body, since fields are instance private, this will be to access the capsule
field. Excluding the mut receiver, such methods cannot have any mut or read parameters,
their return type must not be mut, and their throws clause must be empty.12.
As capsule mutators use this only once, and have no read or mut parameters, this will
not be accessible during execution. This is important, as it allows the invariant to be violated
part way through the capsule mutator, but re established by the end. Preventing mut return
types ensures that such methods cannot leak out a mutable alias to the capsule field, which
could then be used to break the invariant. Note that these restrictions do not apply when
the receiver of the field access is capsule, since we guarantee that the receiver is not in the
ROG of any of its capsule fields, and hence it can never be seen afterwards.
Monitoring
The language runtime will insert automatic calls to invariant, if such a call returns false,
an unchecked exception will be thrown. Such calls are inserted in the following points:
After a constructor call, on the newly created object.
After a field update, on the receiver.
After a capsule mutator method returns, on the receiver of the method13.
11 If the invariant were not pure, it would be nearly impossible to ensure that it would return true at any
point.
12To allow capsule mutators to leak checked exceptions, we would need check the invariant when such
exceptions are leaked. However, this would make the runtime semantics of checked exceptions inconsistent
with unchecked ones.
13The invariant is not checked if the call was terminated via an an unchecked exception, since strong
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In Appendix A, we show that these checks, together with our aforementioned restrictions,
are sufficient to ensure our guarantee that all objects involved in execution (except as part of
an invariant check) are valid.
Relaxations
The above restrictions can be partially relaxed without breaking soundness, however this
would not make the proof more interesting. In particular:
invariant methods can be allowed to call instance methods that in turn only use this
to read imm or capsule, or call other such instance methods. With this relaxation, the
semantics of invariant needs to be understood with the body of those methods inlined;
thus the semantics of the inlined code needs to be logically reinterpreted in the context of
invariant, where this may be invalid. In some sense, those inlined methods and field
accesses can be thought of as macro expanded, and hence are not dynamically dispatched.
Such inlining has been implemented in L42.
We could allow all fields to be public, however capsule fields, mentioned in the invariant
of their containing class, should not be accessible over a mut receiver other than this.
Even without this relaxation, however, getters and setters could be used to simulate
public fields.
Unrestricted readonly access to capsule fields can be allowed by automatically generated
getters of the form read method read C f() { return this.f; }. Such getters are
already a fundamental part of the L42 language.
Java style constructors could be allowed, provided that this is only used as the receiver
of field initialisations. L42 does not provide such constructors, but one can always write
a static factory method that behaves equivalently.
Both L42, and our formal language (see Section 4) do not have traditional subclassing, rather
all ‘classes’ are either interfaces (which only have abstract methods), or are final (which
cannot be subtyped). In a language with traditional subclassing, invariant methods would
implicitly start with a check that super.invariant() returns true. Note that invariant
checks would not be performed at the end of super(..) constructor calls, but only at the
end of new expressions, as happens in [30].
4 Formal Language Model
In order to model our system, we need to formalise an imperative object oriented language
with exceptions, object capabilities, and rich type system support for TMs and strong
exception safety. Formal models of the runtime semantics of such languages are simple, but
defining and proving, such a type system would require a paper of its own, and indeed many
such papers exist in literature [67, 68, 38, 22, 43]. Thus we are going to assume that we
already have an expressive and sound type system enforcing the properties we need, and
instead focus on invariant checking. We clearly list in Appendix A the assumptions we make
on such a type system, so that any language satisfying them, such as L42, can soundly
support our invariant protocol.
To keep our small step semantics as conventional as possible, we follow Pierce [64] and
Featherweight Java [41], and assume:
An implicit program/class table.
exception safety guarantees the object will be unreachable anyway.
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e ::= x | l | true | false | e.m(e) | e.f | e.f = e | new C(e) | try {e1} catch {e2} expression
| M(l;e1;e2) | tryσ{e1} catch {e2} runtime expr.
v ::= l value
Ev ::=  | Ev.m(e) | v.m(v1,Ev, e2) | v.f = Ev evaluation context
| new C(v1,Ev, e2) | M(l;Ev;e) | M(l;v;Ev) | tryσ{Ev} catch {e}
E ::=  | E.m(e) | e.m(e1,E , e2) | e.f = E | new C(e1,E , e2) full context
| M(l;E;e) | M(l;e;E) | tryσ?{E} catch {e} | tryσ?{e} catch {E}
CD ::= class C implements C{F M} | interface C implements C{M} class declaration
F ::= T f ; field
M ::= µ method T m(T1 x1,...,Tn xn) e? method
µ ::= mut | imm | capsule | read type modifier
T ::= µC type
rl ::= v.m(v) | v.f | v1.f = v2 | newC(v), where l ∈ {v, v1, v2, v} redex containing l
error ::= Ev[M(l;v;false)], where Ev not of form E ′v[tryσ?{E ′′v} catch {_}] validation error
Figure 1 Grammar
Memory, σ : l → C{v}, is a finite map from locations, l, to annotated tuples, C{v},
representing objects; where C is the class name and v are the field values. We use the
notation σ[l.f = v] to update a field of an object, and σ[l.f ] to access one.
A main expression that is reduced in the context of such a memory and program.
A typing relation, Σ; Γ ` e : T , where the expression e can contain locations and free
variables. The types of locations are encoded in a memory environment, Σ : l→ C, while
the types of free variables are encoded in a variable environment, Γ : x→ T .
We use Σσ to trivially extract the corresponding Σ from a σ.
To encode object capabilities and I/O, we assume a special location c of class Cap. This
location would refer to an object whose fields model things like the content of files. In order
to simplify our proof, we assume that:
instances of Cap cannot be created with a new expression,
all methods in the Cap class must require a mut receiver, and will mutate its ROG,
Cap can only have mut fields, and
Cap’s invariant method is defined to return true.
For simplicity, we do not formalise actual exception objects, rather we have errors, which
correspond to expressions which are currently ‘throwing’ an exception; in this way there is
no value associated with the error. Our L42 implementation instead models exceptions as
throwing an imm value, formalising exceptions in this way would not cause any interesting
variation of our proof.
Grammar
The detailed grammar is defined in Figure 1. Most of our expressions are standard. Monitor
expressions are of the form M(l;e1;e2), they are run time expressions and thus are not present
in method bodies, rather they are generated by our reduction rules inside the main expression.
Here, l refers to the object being monitored, e1 is the expression which is being monitored,
and e2 denotes the evaluation of l.invariant(). If, at any point in execution, e2 is false, then
l’s invariant failed to hold; such a monitor expression corresponds to the throwing of an
unchecked exception.
In addition, our reduction rules will annotate try expressions with the original state
of memory. This is used to model the guarantee of strong exception safety, that is, the
annotated memory will not be mutated by executing the body of the try.
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(update)
σ|l.f = v → σ[l.f = v]|M(l;l;l.invariant())
(new)
σ|new C(v)→ σ, l 7→ C{v}|M(l;l;l.invariant())
(mcall)
σ|l.m(v1,..., vn)→ σ|e′[this = l, x1 = v1,..., xn = vn]
σ(l) = C{_}
C.m = µ method T m(T1 x1...Tnxn) e
if ∃f such that C.f = capsule_, µ = mut,
f insideC.m, and f insideC.invariant
then e′ = M(l;e;l.invariant())
otherwise e′ = e
(monitor exit)
σ|M(l;v;true)→ σ|v
(ctxv)
σ0|e0 → σ1|e1
σ0|Ev[e0]→ σ1|Ev[e1]
(try enter)
σ|try {e1} catch {e2}→ σ|tryσ{e1} catch {e2}
(try ok)
σ, σ′|tryσ{v} catch {_}→ σ, σ′|v
(try error)
σ,_|tryσ{error} catch {e}→ σ|e
(access)
σ|l.f → σ|σ[l.f ]
Figure 2 Reduction rules
Well Formedness Criteria
We additionally restrict the grammar with the following well formedness criteria:
invariant methods and capsule mutators satisfy the restrictions in Section 3.
Field accesses and updates in methods are of the form this.f or this.f = e, respectively.
Field accesses and updates in the main expression are of the form l.f or l.f = e, respectively.
Locations that are preserved by try blocks are never monitored, that is, for tryσ{e} _, if
e is of the form E [M(l;_;_)], then l /∈ σ.
Reduction rules
Our reduction rules are defined in Figure 2. They are pretty standard, except for our handling
of monitor expressions. We define the relation inside as follows:
f insideC.m iff C.m = _ method_E [this.f ]
Monitor expressions are added after all field updates, new expressions, and calls to capsule
mutators. Monitor expressions are only a proof device, they need not be implemented
directly as presented. For example, in L42 we implement them by statically injecting calls to
invariant at the end of setters, factory methods and capsule mutators; this works as L42
does not have primitive expression forms for field updates and constructors, rather they are
uniformly represented as method calls.
Our ctxv rule evaluates monitor expressions, M(l;e1;e2), by first evaluating e1 and then
e2. If e2 evaluates to true, then the monitor succeeded, and will yield the result of e1. If
however e2 evaluated to false, then the monitor failure will be caught by our try error
rule, as will any other uncaught monitor failure in e1 or e2.
Statement of Soundness
We define a deterministic reduction to mean that exactly one reduction is possible:
σ0|e0 ⇒ σ1|e1 iff {σ1|e1} = {σ|e, where σ0|e0 → σ|e}
An object is valid iff calling its invariant method would deterministically produce true in
a finite number of steps, i.e. it does not evaluate to false, fail to terminate, or produce an
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error. We also require evaluating invariant to preserve existing memory (σ), however new
objects (σ′) can be created and freely mutated.
valid(σ, l) iff σ|l.invariant()⇒+σ, σ′|true.
To allow the invariant method to be called on an invalid object, and access fields on such
object, we define the set of trusted execution steps as the the call to invariant itself, and
any field accesses inside its evaluation. Note that this only applies to single small step
reductions, and not the entire evaluation of invariant.
trusted(Ev, rl) iff
either rl = l.invariant() and Ev = E ′v[M(l;v;)],
or rl = l.f and Ev = E ′v[M(l;v;E ′′v)].
Finally, we define what it means to soundly enforce our invariant protocol: every object
referenced by any untrusted redex is valid.
I Theorem 1 (Soundness). if c : Cap; ∅ ` e : T and c 7→ Cap{_}|e →+ σ|Ev[rl], then either
valid(σ, l) or trusted(Ev, rl).
5 Invariants Over Immutable State
In this section we consider validation over fields of imm types. In the next section we detail
our technique for capsule fields.
In the following code Person has a single immutable (non final) field name:
class Person {
read method Bool invariant () { return !name.isEmpty (); }
private String name;//the default modifier imm is applied here
read method String name() { return this.name; }
mut method String name(String name) { this.name = name; }
Person(String name) { this.name = name; }
}
Person only has immutable fields and its constructor only uses this to initialise them. Note
that the name field is not final, thus Person objects can change state during their lifetime.
This means that the ROGs of all Persons fields are immutable, but Persons themselves may
be mutable. We can easily enforce Person’s invariant by generating checks on the result of
this.invariant(): immediately after each field update, and at the end of the constructor.
class Person { .. // Same as before
mut method String name(String name) {
this.name = name; // check after field update
if (!this.invariant ()) { throw new Error (...); }}
Person(String name) {
this.name = name; // check at end of constructor
if (!this.invariant ()) { throw new Error (...); }}
}
Such checks will be generated/injected, and not directly written by the programmer. If
we were to relax (as in Rust), or even eliminate (as in Java), the support for TMs or OCs,
the enforcement of our invariant protocol for the Person class would become harder, or even
impossible.
Unrestricted use of non determinism
Allowing the invariant method to (indirectly) perform a non deterministic operation, such
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as by creating new capability objects, could break our guarantee that (manually) calling it
always returns true. For example consider this simple and contrived (mis)use of person:
class EvilString extends String {
@Override read method Bool isEmpty () {
// Create a new capability object out of thin air
return new Random (). bool (); }
} ..
method mut Person createPersons(String name) {
// we can not be sure that name is not an EvilString
mut Person schrodinger = new Person(name); // exception here?
assert schrodinger.invariant (); // will this fail?
..}
Despite the code for Person.invariant intuitively looking correct and deterministic, the
above call to it is not. Obviously this breaks any reasoning and would make our protocol
unsound. In particular, note how in the presence of dynamic class loading, we have no
way of knowing what the type of name could be. Since our system allows non determinism
only through capability objects, and restricts their creation, the above example would be
prevented.
Allowing Internal Mutation Through Back Doors
Suppose we relax our rules by allowing interior mutability as in Rust and Javari, where
sneaky mutation of the ROG of an ‘immutable’ object is allowed. Those back doors are
usually motivated by performance reasons, however in [38] they briefly discuss how a few
trusted language primitives can be used to perform caching and other needed optimisations,
without the need for back doors.
Our example shows that such back doors can be used to break determinism of invariant
methods, by allowing the invariant to store and read information about previous calls. In
the following example we use MagicCounter as a back door to remotely break the invariant
of person without any interaction with the person object itself:
class MagicCounter {
method Int increment (){
// Magic mutation through an imm receiver , equivalent to i++
}}
class NastyS extends String {..
MagicCounter evil = new MagicCounter (0);
@Override read method Bool isEmpty () {
return this.evil.increment () != 2; }
} ..
NastyS name = new NastyS("bob"); //TMs believe name’s ROG is imm
Person person = new Person(name); // person is valid , counter =1
name.increment (); // counter == 2, person is now broken
person.invariant (); // returns false!, counter == 3
person.invariant (); // returns true , counter == 4
Strong Exception Safety
The ability to catch and recover from invariant failures is extremely useful as it allows
programs to take corrective action. Since we represent invariant failures by throwing
unchecked exceptions, programs can recover from them with a conventional try–catch. Due
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to the guarantees of strong exception safety, any object that has been mutated during a try
block is now unreachable (as happens in alias burying [13]). In addition, since unchecked
exceptions are immutable, they can not contain a read reference to any object (such as the
this reference seen by invariant methods). These two properties ensure that an object
whose invariant fails will be unreachable after the invariant failure has been captured. If
instead we were to not enforce strong exception safety, an invalid object could be made
reachable:
mut Person bob = new Person("bob");
// Catch and ignore invariant failure:
try { bob.name(""); } catch (Error t) { } // ill typed in L42
assert bob.invariant (); // bob is invalid!
As you can see, recovering from an invariant failure in this way is unsound and would
break our protocol.
6 Invariants over encapsulated state
Consider managing the shipment of items, where there is a maximum combined weight:
class ShippingList {
capsule Items items;
read method Bool invariant () {
return this.items.weight () <= 300; }
ShippingList(capsule Items items) {
this.items = items;
if (!this.invariant ()) {throw Error (...);}} // injected check
mut method Void addItem(Item item) {
this.items.add(item);
if (!this.invariant ()) {throw Error (...);}} // injected check
}
To handle this class we just inject calls to invariant at the end of the constructor and the
addItem method. This is safe since the items field is declared capsule. Relaxing our system
to allow a mut modifier for the items field and the corresponding constructor parameter
breaks the code: the cargo we received in the constructor may already be compromised:
mut Items items = ...;
mut ShippingList l = new ShippingList(items ); // l is valid
items.addItem(new HeavyItem ()); // l is now invalid!
As you can see it would be possible for external code with no knowledge of the ShippingList
to mutate its items.14
Our restrictions on capsule mutators ensure that capsule fields are essentially an exclusive
mutable reference. Removing these restrictions would break our invariant protocol. If we
were to allow x.items to be seen as mut, where x is not this, then even if the ShippingList
14Conventional ownership solves these problems by requiring a deep clone of all the data the constructor
takes as input, as well as all exposed data (possibly through getters). In order to write correct library
code in mainstream languages like Java and C++, defensive cloning [12] is needed. For performance
reasons, this is hardly done in practice and is a continuous source of bugs and unexpected behaviour [12].
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has full control at initialisation time, such control may be lost later, and code unaware of the
ShippingList could break it:
mut ShippingList l = new ShippingList(new Items ()); // l is ok
mut Items evilAlias = l.items // here l loses control
evilAlias.addItem(new HeavyItem ()); // now l is invalid!
If we allowed a mut return type the following would be accepted:
mut method mut Items expose(C c) {return c.foo(this.items );}
Depending on dynamic dispatch, c.foo() may just be the identity function, thus we
would get in the same situation as the former example.
Allowing this to be used more than once can also cause problems:
mut method imm Void multiThis(C c) {
read Foo f = c.foo(this);
this.items.add(new HeavyItem ());
f.hi(); } // Can ‘this’ be observed here?
If the former code were accepted, this may be reachable from f, thus f.hi() may observe
an invalid object.
In order to ensure that a second reference to this is not reachable through the parameters,
we only accept imm and capsule parameters. If we were however to accept a read parameter,
as in the example below, we would be in the same situation as before, where f may contain
a reference to this:
mut method imm Void addHeavy(read Foo f) {
this.items.add(new HeavyItem ())
f.hi() } // Can ’this’ be observed here?
...
mut ShippingList l = new ShippingList ();
read Foo f = new Foo(l);
l.addHeavy(f); // We pass another reference to ‘l’ through f
7 GUI Case study
Here we show that we are able to verify classes with circular mutable object graphs, that
interact with the real world using I/O. Our case study involves a GUI with containers
(SafeMovables) and Buttons; the SafeMovable class has an invariant to ensure that its
children are completely contained within it and do not overlap. The Buttons move their
SafeMovable when pressed. We have a Widget interface which provides methods to get
Widgets’ size and position as well as children (a list of Widgets). Both SafeMovables and
Buttons implement Widget. Crucially, since the children of SafeMovable is a list of Widgets
it can contain other SafeMovables, and all queries to their size and position are dynamically
dispatched, such queries are also used in SafeMovable’s invariant. Here we show a simplified
version15, where SafeMovable has just one Button, and certain sizes and positions are fixed.
Note that Widgets is a class representing a mutable list of mut Widgets.
15The full version, written in L42, which uses a different syntax, is available in our artifact at
http://l42.is/EcoopArtifact.zip
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class SafeMovable implements Widget { capsule Box box;
@Override read method Int left() { return this.box.l; }
@Override read method Int top() { return this.box.t; }
@Override read method Int width () { return 300; }
@Override read method Int height () { return 300; }
@Override read method read Widgets children () {
return this.box.c; }
@Override mut method Void dispatch(Event e) {
for (Widget w:this.box.c) { w.dispatch(e); }}
read method Bool invariant () {..}
SafeMovable(capsule Widgets cs) { this.box = makeBox(c); }
static method capsule Box makeBox(capsule Widgets c) {
mut Box b = new Box(5, 5, cs);
b.c.add(new Button(0, 0, 10, 10, new MoveAction(b));
return b; } //mut b is soundly promoted to capsule
}
class Box { Int l; Int t; mut Widgets c;
Box(Int l, Int t, mut Widgets c) {..}
}
class MoveAction implements Action { mut Box outer;
MoveAction(mut Box outer) { this.outer = outer; }
mut method Void process(Event event) { this.outer.l += 1; }
}
..
//main expression; #$ is a capability method making a Gui object
Gui.#$(). display(new SafeMovable (..));
As you can see, Boxes encapsulate the state of the SafeMovables that can change over
time: left, top, and children. Also note how the ROG of Box is circular: since the
MoveActions inside Buttons need a reference to the containing Box in order to move it. Even
though the children of SafeMovables are fully encapsulated, we can still easily dispatch
events to them using dispatch. Once a Button receives an Event with a matching ID, it
will call its Action’s process method.
Our example shows that the restrictions of TMs and OCs are flexible enough to encode
interactive GUI programs, where widgets may circularly reference other widgets. In order
to perform this case study we had to first implement a simple GUI Library in L42. This
library uses object capabilities to draw the widgets on screen, as well as fetch and dispatch
the events. Importantly, neither our application, nor the underlying GUI library require
back doors into either our type modifier or capability system to function, demonstrating the
practical usability of our restrictions.
The Invariant
SafeMovable is the only class in our GUI that has an invariant, our system automatically
checks it in two places: the end of its constructor and the end of its dispatch method (is a
capsule mutator). There are no other checks inserted since we never do a field update on a
SafeMovable. The code for the invariant is just a couple of simple nested loops:
read method Bool invariant () {
for(Widget w1 : this.box.c) {
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if(!this.inside(w1)) { return false; }
for(Widget w2 : this.box.c) {
if(w1!=w2 && SafeMovable.overlap(w1, w2)){ return false ;}}}
return true;}
Here SafeMovable.overlap is a static method that simply checks that the bounds of
the widgets don’t overlap. The call to this.inside(w1) similarly checks that the widget is
not outside the bounds of this; this instance method call is allowed as inside only uses
this to access its fields.
Our Experiment
As shown in the figure to the left, counting both
SafeMovables and Buttons, our main method cre-
ates 21 widgets: a top level (green) SafeMovable
without buttons, containing 4 (red, blue, and black)
SafeMovables with 4 (gray) buttons each. When a but-
ton is pressed it moves the containing SafeMovable a
small amount in the corresponding direction. This set
up is not overly complicated, the maximum nesting
level of Widgets is 5. Our main method automatically
presses each of the 16 buttons once. In L42, using
the approach of this paper, this resulted in 77 calls to
SafeMovable’s invariant.
Comparison With Visible State Semantics
As an experiment, we set our implementation to generate invariant checks following the
visible state semantics approaches of D and Eiffel [3, 24], where the invariant of the receiver
is instead checked at the start and end of every public (in D) and qualified16 (in Eiffel)
method calls. In our SafeMovable class, all methods are public, and all calls are qualified,
thus this difference is irrelevant. Neither protocol performs invariant checks on field accesses
or updates, however due to the ‘uniform access principle’, Eiffel allows fields to directly
implement methods, allowing the width and height fields to directly implement Widgets
width and height methods. On the other hand in D, one would have to write getter methods,
which would invoke invariant checks. When we ran our test case following the D approach,
the invariant method was called 52, 734, 053 times, whereas the Eiffel approach ‘only’ called
it 14, 816, 207 times;in comparison our invariant protocol only performed 77 calls. The
number of checks is exponential in the depth of the GUI: the invariant of a SafeMovable
will call the width, height, left, and top methods of its children, which may themselves be
SafeMovables, and hence such calls may invoke further invariant checks. Note that width
and height are simply getters for fields, whereas the other two are non trivial methods.
Spec# Comparison
We also encoded our example in Spec#17, which like L42, statically verifies aliasing/ownership
properties, as well as the admissibility of invariants. The backend of the L42 GUI library is
written in Java, we did not port it to Spec#, rather we just simulate the backend, and don’t
actually display a GUI in Spec#.
16That is, the receiver is not this.
17We compiled Spec# using the latest available source (from 19/9/2014). The verifier available online at
rise4fun.com/SpecSharp behalves differently.
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We ran our code through the Spec# verifier (powered by Boogie [4]), which only gave us
2 warnings18: that the invariant of SafeMovable was not known to hold at the end of its
constructor and dispatch method. Like our system however, Spec# checks the invariant at
those two points at runtime. Thus the code is equivalently verified in both Spec# and L42;
in particular it performed exactly the same number (77) of runtime invariant checks.19
We found it quite difficult to encode the GUI in Spec#, due to its unintuitive and rigid
ownership discipline. In particular we needed to use many more annotations, which were
larger and had greater variety. In the following table we summarise the annotation burden,
for the program that defines and displays the SafeMovables and our GUI; as well as the
library which defines Buttons, Widget, and event handling.20:
Spec# Spec# L42 L42
program library program library
Total number of annotations 40 19 19 18
Tokens (except .,;(){}[] and whitespace) 106 34 18 18
Characters (with minimal whitespace) 619 207 74 60
To encode the GUI example in L42, the only annotations we needed were the 3 type modi-
fiers: mut, read, and capsule. Our Spec# code requires things such as, purity, immutability,
ownership, method pre/post conditions and method modification annotations. In addition, it
requires the use of 4 different ownership functions including explicit ownership assignments.
In total we used 18 different kinds of annotations in Spec#. Together these annotations can
get quite long, such as the following precondition on SafeMovable’s constructor:
requires Owner.Same(Owner.ElementProxy(children), children);
The Spec# code also required us to deviate from the style of code we showed in our simplified
version: we could not write a usable children method in Widget that returns a list of
children, instead we had to write children_count() and children(int i) methods; we
also needed to create a trivial class with a [Pure] constructor (since Object’s one is not
marked as such). In contrast, the only strange thing we had to in L42 was creating Boxes
by using an additional variable in a nested scope. This is needed to delineate scopes for
promotions. Based on these results, we believe our system is significantly simpler and easier
to use.
The Box Pattern
Our design, using an inner Box object, is a common pattern in static verification: where
one encapsulates all relevant mutating state into an encapsulated sub object which is not
exposed to users.
Both our L42 and Spec# code required us to use the box pattern for our SafeMovable,
due to the circular object graph caused by the Actions of Buttons needing to change their
enclosing SafeMovable’s position.
The Transform Pattern
Suppose we want to scale a Widget, we could add mut setters for width, height, left, and
top in the Widget interface. However, if we also wish to scale its children we have a problem,
18We used assume statements, equivalent to Java’s assert, to dynamically check array bounds. This
aligns the code with L42, which also performs such checks at runtime.
19We also encoded our GUI in Microsoft Code Contracts [27], whose unsound heuristic also calls the
invariant 77 times; however Code Contract does not enforce the encapsulation of children, thus their
approach would not be sound in our context.
20We only count constructs Spec# adds over C# as annotations, we also do not count annotations related
to array bounds or null checks.
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since Widget.children returns a read Widgets, which does not allow mutation. We could
of course add a mut method zoom to the Widget interface, however this does not scale if more
operations are desired. If instead Widget.children returned a mut Widgets, it would be
difficult for Widget implementations, such as SafeMovable, to keep control of their ROGs.
A simple and practical solution would be to define a transform method in Widget, and
a Transformer interface like so:21
interface Transformer <T> { method Void apply(mut T elem); }
interface Widget { ..
mut method Void top(Int that); // setters for immutable data
mut method read Void transform(Transformer <Widgets > t);
} // transformers for possibly encapsulated data
class SafeMovable { ..
mut method Void transform(Transformer <Widgets > t) {
return t.apply(this.box.c); }} // Well typed capsule mutator
The transform method offers an expressive power similar to mut getters, but prevents
Widgets from leaking out. With a Transformer, a zoom function could be simply:
static method Void zoom(mut Widget w) {
w.transform(ws -> { for (wi : ws) { zoom(wi,scale ); }});
w.width(w.width () / 2); ..; w.top(w.top() / 2); }
8 Related work
Type Modifiers
We rely on a combination of modifiers that are supported by at least 3 languages/lines of
research: L42 [68, 67, 43, 35], Pony [22, 23], and Gordon et. al. [38]; each of these works
is accompanied by proofs about the properties of those modifiers. Since such proofs have
already been done, in this work we just assume the required properties. Those approaches
all support deep/strong interpretation, without back doors.
TM approaches like Javari [75, 15] and Rust [49] are unsuitable since they introduce back
doors which are not easily verifiable as being used properly. Many approaches just try to
preserve purity (as for example [63]), but here we also need aliasing control. Ownership [20,
79, 25] is another popular form of aliasing control that can be used as a building block for
static verification [57, 7]. Capsule/isolated local variables are affine in that they can be
used only once, however this linearity is a property of variables, not expressions or fields.
Linear/affine types extend this idea further, however they usually do not consider the ROGs
of such types, or work in an OO setting [56, 29].
Object Capabilities
In literature, OCs are used to provide a wide range of guarantees, and many variations are
present. Object capabilities [55], in conjunction with type modifiers, are able to enforce
purity of code in a modular way, without requiring the use of monads. L42 and Gordon use
OCs simply to reason about I/O and non determinism. This approach is best exemplified by
Joe-E [32], which is a self contained and minimalistic language using OCs over a subset of
Java in order to reason about determinism. However, in order for Joe-E to be a subset of
21A more general transformer could return a generic read R.
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Java, they leverage on a simplified model of immutability: immutable classes must be final
with only final fields that refer to immutable classes. In Joe-E, every method that only takes
instances of immutable classes is pure. Thus their model would not allow the verification
of purity for invariant methods of mutable objects. In contrast our model has a more fine
grained representation of mutability: it is reference based instead of class based. In our work,
every method taking only read or imm references is pure, regardless of their class type.
Class invariant protocols
Class invariants are a fundamental part of the design by contract methodology. Invariant
protocols differ wildly and can be unsound or complicated, particular due to re entrancy and
aliasing [45, 26, 53].
While invariant protocols all seem to check and assume the invariant of an object after
its construction, they handle invariants differently across object lifetimes; popular sound
approaches include:
The invariants of objects in a steady state are known to hold: that is when execution
is not inside any of the objects public methods [36]. Invariants need to be constantly
maintained between calls to public methods [77].
The invariant of the receiver before a public method call and at the end of every public
method body needs to be ensured. The invariant of the receiver at the beginning of
a public method body and after a public method call can be assumed [17, 26]. Some
approaches ensure the invariant of the receiver of the calling method, rather than the
called method [58]. JML [34] relaxes these requirements for helper methods, whose
semantic is the same as if they were inlined.
The same as above, but only for the bodies of ‘selectively exported’ (i.e. non instance
private) methods, and only for ‘qualified’ (i.e. not this) calls [53].
The invariant of an object is assumed only when a contract requires the object be ‘packed’.
It is checked after an explicit ‘pack’ operation, and objects can later be ‘unpacked’ [5].
Or, as in this work, the invariant of any object which could be involved in execution is
assumed to hold. It is checked after every modification of the object or its encapsulated
ROG.
These different protocols can be deceivingly similar, and some approaches like JML suggest
verifying a simpler approach (that method calls preserve the invariant of the receiver) but
assume a stronger one (the invariant of every object, except this, holds).
Runtime Verification Tools
Many languages and tools support some form of runtime invariant checking (e.g. Eiffel [52],
D [3], and JML [17]). By looking to a survey by Voigt et al. [76] and the extensive MOP
project [50], it seems that most runtime verification tools (RV) empower users to implement
the kind of monitoring they see fit for their specific problem at hand. This means that users
are responsible for deciding, designing, and encoding both the logical properties and the
instrumentation criteria [50]. In the context of class invariants, this means the user defines
the invariant protocol and the soundness of such protocol is not checked by the tool.
In practice, this means that the logic, instrumentation, and implementation end up
connected: a specific instrumentation strategy is only good to test certain logic properties in
certain applications. No guarantee is given that the implemented instrumentation strategy
is able to support the required logic in the monitored application. Some of these tools are
designed to support class invariants: for example InvTS [37] lets you write Python conditions
that are verified on a set of Python objects, but the programmer needs to be able to predict
which objects are in need of being checked and to use a simpler domain specific language
to target them. Hence if a programmer makes a mistake while using this domain specific
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language, invariant checking will not be triggered. Some tools are intentionally unsound
and just perform invariant checking following some heuristic that is expected to catch most
failures: such as jmlrac [17] and Microsoft Code Contracts [28].
Many works attempt to move out of the ‘RV tool’ philosophy to ensure RV monitors work
as expected, as for example the study of contracts as refinements of types [31]. However,
such work is only interested in pre and post conditions, not class invariants.
Our invariant protocol is much stronger then visible state semantics, and keeps the
invariant under tight control. Gopinathan et. al.’s. [36] approach keeps a similar level of
control: relying on powerful aspect oriented support, they detect any field update in the
whole ROG of any object, and check all the invariants that such update may have violated.
We agree with their criticism of visible state semantics, where methods still have to assume
that any object may be broken; in such case calling any public method would trigger an
error, but while the object is just passed around (and for example stored in collections), the
broken state will not be detected; Gopinathan et. al. says “there are many instances where
o’s invariant is violated by the programmer inadvertently changing the state of p when o is
in a steady state. Typically, o and p are objects exposed by the API, and the programmer
(who is the user of the API), unaware of the dependency between o and p, calls a method of
p in such a way that o’s invariant is violated. The fact that the violation occurred is detected
much later, when a method of o is called again, and it is difficult to determine exactly where
such violations occur.”
However, their approach addresses neither exceptions nor non determinism caused by
I/O, so their work is unsound if those aspects are taken into consideration.
Their approach is very computationally intensive, but we think it is powerful enough
that it could even be used to roll back the very field update that caused the invariant to fail,
making the object valid again. We considered a roll back approach for our work, however
rolling back a single field update is likely to be completely unexpected, rather we should roll
back more meaningful operations, similarly to what happens with transactional memory, and
so is likely to be very hard to support efficiently. Using TMs to enforce strong exception
safety is a much simpler alternative, providing the same level of safety, albeit being more
restrictive (namely that if the operation did succeed it is still effectively rolled back).
Chaperones and impersonators [71] lifts the techniques of gradual typing [73, 74, 78] to
work on general purpose predicates, where values can be wrapped to ensure an invariant
holds. This technique is very powerful and can be used to enforce pre and post conditions by
wrapping function arguments and return values. This technique however does not monitor
the effects of aliasing, as such they may notice if a contract has broken, but not when or why.
In addition, due to the difficulty of performing static analysis in weakly typed languages, they
need to inject runtime checking code around every user facing operation. Aspect oriented
systems like Jose [30], similarly wrap invariant checks around method bodies.
Security and Scalability
Our approach allows verifying an object’s invariant independently of the actual invariants
of other objects. This is in contrast with the main strategy of static verification: to verify
a method, the system assumes the contracts of other methods, and the content of those
contracts is the starting point for their proof. Thus, static verification proceeds like a
mathematical proof: a program is valid if it is all correct, but a single error invalidates all
claims. This makes it hard to perform verification on large programs, or when independently
maintained third party libraries are involved. This is less problematic with a type system,
since its properties are more coarse grained, simpler and easier to check. Static verification
has more flexible and fine grained annotations and often relies on a fragile theorem prover as
Isaac O. G., M. Servetto, and A. Potanin 23:23
a backend.
To soundly verify code embedded in an untrusted environment, as in gradual typing [74, 78],
it is possible to consider a verified core and a runtime verified boundary. You can see our
approach as an extremely modularized version of such system: every class is its own verified
core, and the rest of the code could have Byzantine behaviour. Our formal proofs show that
every class that compiles/type checks is soundly handled by our protocol, independently of
the code that uses such class or any other surrounding code.
Our approach works both in a library setting and with the open world assumption.
Consider for example the work of Parkinson [62]: in his short paper he verified a prop-
erty of the Subject/Observer pattern. However, the proof relies on (any override of) the
Subject.register(Observer) method respecting its contract. Such assumption is unreal-
istic in a real world system with dynamic class loading, and could trivially be broken by a
user defined EvilSubject.
Static Verification
Spec# [8] is a language built on top of C#, it adds various annotations such as method
contracts and class invariants. It primarily follows the Boogie methodology [59] where
(implicit) annotations are used to specify and modify the owner of objects and whether their
invariants are required to hold. Invariants can be ownership based [5], where an invariant
only depends on objects it owns; or visibility based [6, 46], where an invariant may depend on
objects it doesn’t own, provided that the class of such objects know about this dependence.
Unlike our approach, Spec# does not restrict the aliases that may exist for an object, rather
it restricts object mutation: an object cannot be modified if the invariant of its owner is
required to hold. This is more flexible than our approach as it also allows only part of an
object’s ROG to be owned/encapsulated. However as we showed in Section 7, it can become
much more difficult to work with and requires significant annotation since merely having an
alias to an object is insufficient to modify it or call methods on it. Spec# also works with
existing .NET libraries by annotating them with contracts, however such annotations are not
verified. Spec#, like us, does perform runtime checks for invariants and throws unchecked
exceptions on failure. However Spec# does not allow soundly recovering from an invariant
failure, since catching unchecked exceptions in Spec# is intentionally unsound. [48]
Another system is AutoProof [65], a static verifier for Eiffel that also follows the Boogie
methodology, but extends it with semantic collaboration where objects keep track of their
invariants’ dependencies using ghost state. Dafny [44] is a new language where all code is
statically verified, it supports invariants by injecting pre and post conditions following visible
state semantics; however it requires objects to be newly allocated (or cloned) before another
object’s invariant may depend on it. Dafny is also generally highly restrictive with its rules
for mutation, and object construction, it also does not provide any means of performing non
deterministic I/O.
Specification languages
Using a specification language based on the mathematical metalanguage and different from
the program language’s semantics may seem attractive, since it can express uncomputable
concepts, has no mutation or non determinism, and is often easier to formally reason about.
However, a study [18] discovered that developers expect specification languages to follow
the semantics of the underling language, including short circuit semantics and arithmetic
exceptions; thus for example 1/0 || 2>1 should not hold, while 2>1 || 1/0 should, thanks
to short circuiting. This study was influential enough to convince JML to change its
interpretation of logical expressions accordingly [19]. Dafny [44] uses a hybrid approach: it
has mostly the same language for both specification and execution. Specification (‘ghost’)
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contexts can use uncomputable constructs such as universal quantification over infinite sets.
Whereas runtime contexts allow mutation, object allocation and print statements. The
semantics of shared constructs (such as short circuiting logic operators) is the same in both
contexts.
Most runtime verification systems, such as ours, use a metacircular approach: specifications
are simply code in the underlying language. Since specifications are checked at runtime,
they are unable to verify uncomputable contracts. Ensuring determinism in a non functional
language is challenging. Spec# recognizes the need for purity/determinism when method
calls are allowed in contracts [9] ‘There are three main current approaches: a) forbid the use
of functions in specifications, b) allow only provably pure functions, or c) allow programmers
free use of functions. The first approach is not scalable, the second overly restrictive and the
third unsound.’.
They recognize that many tools unsoundly use option (c), such as AsmL [10]. Spec#
aims to follow (b) but only considers non determinism caused by memory mutation, and
allows other non deterministic operations, such as I/O and random number generation. For
example, the following method verifies:
[Pure] bool uncertain () {return new Random (). Next() % 2 == 0;}
And so assert uncertain() == uncertain(); also verifies, but randomly fails with
an exception at runtime. As you can see failing to handle non determinism jeopardises
reasoning.
A simpler and more restrictive solution to these problems is to prevent ‘pure’ functions
from reading or writing to any non final fields, or calling any impure functions. This is
the approach used by [33], one advantage of their approach is that invariants (which must
be ‘pure’) can read from a chain of final fields, even when they are contained in otherwise
mutable objects. However their approach completely prevents invariants from mutating
newly allocated objects, thus greatly restricting how computations can be performed.
9 Conclusions and Future Work
Our approach follows the principles of offensive programming [70], where no attempt to fix
or recover an invalid object is performed and failures (unchecked exceptions) are raised close
to their cause: at the end of constructors creating invalid objects and immediately after field
updates and instance methods that invalidate their receivers.
Our work builds on a specific form of TMs and OCs, whose popularity is growing, and we
expect future languages to support some variation of these. Crucially, any language already
designed with such TMs and OCs can also support our invariant protocol with minimal
added complexity.
We demonstrated the applicability and simplicity of our approach with a GUI example.
Our invariant protocol performs several orders of magnitude less checks than visible state
semantics, and requires much less annotation than Spec#, (the system with the most
comparable goals). In Section 4 we formalised our invariant protocol and in Appendix A we
prove it sound. To stay parametric over the various existing type systems which provably
enforce the properties we require for our proof (and much more), we do not formalise any
specific type system.
One interesting avenue for future work would be to use invariants to encode pre and post
conditions, as done by [33]: where pre and post conditions are encoded as the invariants of
the parameter and return types (respectively). Without good syntax sugar, such an approach
could be quite verbose, however it would ensure that a methods precondition holds during
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the entire execution of a method, and not just the beginning. In addition this could be more
efficient than traditional runtime checking when the same argument is used in the invocations
of methods with the same pre condition, as happens often in practice for recursive methods:
where many parameters are simply parsed unmodified in recursive calls.
The language we presented here restricts the forms of invariant and capsule mutator
methods; such strong restrictions allow for sound and efficient injection of invariant checks.
These restrictions do not get in the way of writing invariants over immutable data, but
the box pattern is required for verifying complex mutable data structures. We believe this
pattern, although verbose, is simple and understandable. While it may be possible for a
more complex and fragile type system to reduce the need for the pattern whilst still ensuring
our desired semantics, we prioritize simplicity and generality.
In order to obtain safety, simplicity, and efficiency we traded some expressive power: the
invariant method can only refer to immutable and encapsulated state. This means that
while we can easily verify that a doubly linked list of immutable elements is correctly linked
up, we can not do the same for a doubly linked lists of mutable elements. Our approach
does not prevent correctly implementing such data structures, but the invariant method
would be unable to access the list’s nodes, since they would contain mut references to shared
objects. In order to verify such data structures we could add a special kind of field which
cannot be (transitively) accessed by invariants; such fields could freely refer to any object.
We are however unsure if such complexity would be justified.
For an implementation of our work to be sound, catching exceptions like stack overflows or
out of memory cannot be allowed in invariant methods, since they are not deterministically
thrown. Currently L42 never allows catching them, however we could also write a (native)
capability method (which can’t be used inside an invariant) that enables catching them.
Another option worth exploring would be to make such exceptions deterministic, perhaps by
giving invariants fixed stack and heap sizes.
Other directions that could be investigated to improve our work include the addition
of syntax sugar to ease the burden of the box and the transform patterns; type modifier
inference, and support for flexible ownership types.
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A Proof and Axioms
Axiomatic Type Properties
As previously discussed, instead of providing a concrete set of type rules, we provide a set of
properties that the type system needs to respect. To express these properties, we first need
some auxiliary definitions.
The encapsulated ROG of l0 is composed of all the objects in the ROG of its immutable
and capsule fields:
l ∈ erog(σ, l0) iff ∃f,Σσ(l0).f ∈ {imm_, capsule_} and l ∈ rog(σ, σ(l0).f)
An object is mutatable in a σ and e if there is an occurrence of l in e, that when seen as imm
makes the expression ill typed:
mutatable(l, σ, e) iff for some T = imm Σσ(l) and E [l] = e,
Σσ; x : T ` E [x] : T ′ does not hold for any T ′.
Here we assume the usual Progress and Subject Reduction Base. Note that Subject Reduction Base
only ensures properties about type checking, not invariant checking.
I Assumption 1 (Progress). if Σσ0 ; ∅ ` e0 : T0, and e0 is not form l or error , then σ0|e0 →
σ1|e1.
I Assumption 2 (Subject Reduction Base). if Σσ0 ; ∅ ` e0 : T0, σ0|e0 → σ1|e1, then Σσ1 ; ∅ `
e1 : T1.
If the result of a field access is mut, the receiver is also mut; field updates are only allowed
on mut receivers:
I Assumption 3 (Mut Field).
(1) if Σ; Γ ` e.f : mut_ then Σ; Γ ` e : mut_ and
(2) if Σ; Γ ` e0.f = e1 : T then Σ; Γ ` e0 : mut_.
An object is not part of the ROG of its immutable or capsule fields22:
I Assumption 4 (Head Not Circular). if Σσ; Γ ` l : T , then l /∈ erog(σ, l).
In a well typed σ and e, if mutatable l2 is reachable through the erog of l1, and l1 is
reachable through the erog of l0, then all the paths connecting l0 and l2 pass trough l1; thus
if we were to remove l1 from the object graph, l0 would no longer reach l2:
I Assumption 5 (Capsule Tree). If Σσ; Γ ` e : T , l2 ∈ erog(σ, l1), l1 ∈ erog(σ, l0),
and mutatable(l2, σ, e) then l2 /∈ erog(σ \ l1, l0).
Capsule Tree and Head Not Circular together imply that capsule fields section the object
graph into a tree of nested ‘balloons’, where nodes are mutable encapsulated objects and
edges are given by reachability between those objects in the original memory: if l2 is in
the encapsulated ROG of l1, and l2 is mutatable and reachable through l1, then l2 must be
reachable by a capsule field. Thanks to Head Not Circular and l1 ∈ erog(σ, l0) we can derive
that l0 /∈ erog(σ, l1).
The execution of an expression with no mut free variables is deterministic and does not
mutate pre existing memory (and thus does not not perform I/O by mutating the pre existing
c):
I Assumption 6 (Determinism). if ∅; Γ ` e : T , ∀x (Γ(x) 6= mut_), and σ|e′ →+ σ′|e′′ then
σ|e′ ⇒+ σ,_|e′′, where e′ = e[x1 = l1,..., xn = ln] and Σσ; ∅ ` e′ : T
22This is not strictly true in L42, as 42 allows circular objects with fwd imm fields, however such objects
cannot have an invariant.
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For each try–catch, execution preserves the memory needed to continue the execution
in case of an error (the memory visible outside of the try).
I Assumption 7 (Strong Exception Safety). if Σσ,σ′ ; ∅ ` E [tryσ{e0} catch {e1}] : T and
σ, σ′|E [tryσ{e0} catch {e1}]→ σ′′|E [tryσ{e′} catch {e1}] then σ′′ = σ,_ and Σσ; ∅ ` E [e1] : T
Note that our last well formedness rule requires update and mcall to introduce mon-
itor expressions only over locations that are not preserved by try blocks. This can be
achieved, since monitors are introduced around mutation operations (and new expression),
and Strong Exception Safety ensures no mutation happens on preserved memory.
Proof of Soundness
It is hard to prove Soundness directly, so we first define a stronger property, called Stronger Soundness,
and show that it is preserved during reductions by means of conventional Progress and
Subject Reduction (Progress is one of our assumptions, while Subject Reduction relies heavily upon
Subject Reduction Base). That is:
Progress ∧ Subject Reduction ⇒ Stronger Soundness, and
Stronger Soundness ⇒ Soundness.
Stronger Soundness ⇒ Soundness
Stronger Soundness depends on wellEncapsulated, monitored and OK :
wellEncapsulated(σ, e, l0) iff ∀l ∈ erog(σ, l0), not mutatable(l, σ, e).
The main idea is that an object is well encapsulated if its encapsulated state cannot be
modified by e.
An object is monitored if execution is currently inside of a monitor for that object, and
the monitored expression e1 does not contain l as a proper subexpression:
monitored(e, l) iff e = Ev[M(l;e1;e2)] and either e1 = l, or l is not inside e1.
A monitored object is associated with an expression that can not observe it, but may reference
its internal representation directly. In this way, we can safely modify its representation before
checking its invariant.
The idea is that at the start the object will be valid and e1 will reference l; but during
reduction, l will be used to modify the object; only after that moment, the object may
become invalid.
Define OK (σ, e):
∀l ∈ dom(σ) either
1. garbage(l, σ, e),
2. valid(σ, l) and wellEncapsulated(σ, e, l), or
3. monitored(e, l).
Finally, the system is in an OK state if all objects in memory, are either not (transitively)
reachable from the expression (thus can be garbage collected), valid and encapsulated, or
currently monitored.
I Theorem 2 (Stronger Soundness). if c : Cap; ∅ ` e0 : T0 and c 7→ Cap{_}|e0 →+ σ|e, then
OK(σ, e).
Starting from only the capability object, any well typed expression e0 can be reduced in an
arbitrary number of steps, and OK will always hold.
I Theorem 3. Stronger Soundness ⇒ Soundness
Proof. By Stronger Soundness, each l in the current redex must be OK :
1. If l is garbage, it cannot be in the current redex, a contradiction.
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2. If valid(σ, l), then l is valid, so thanks to Determinism no invalid object could be observed.
3. Otherwise, if monitored(e, l) then either:
we are executing inside of e1, thus the current redex is inside of a sub expression of
the monitor that does not contain l, a contradiction.
or we are executing inside e2: by our reduction rules, all monitor expressions start
with e2 = l.invariant(), thus the first execution step of e2 is trusted. Further execution
steps are also trusted, since by well formedness the body of invariant methods only
use this (now replaced with l) to read fields.
In any of the possible cases above, Soundness holds for l, and so it holds for all redexes.
Subject Reduction
Define fieldGuarded(σ, e):
∀E such that e = E [l.f ] and Σσ(l).f = capsule_, and f inside Σσ(l).invariant()
either ∀T, ∀C,Σσ; x : mutC 6` E [x] : T , or
E = E ′[M(l;E ′′;e)] and l is contained exactly once in E ′′.
That is, all mut capsule field accesses are individually guarded by monitors. Note how we
use C in x : mutC to guess the type of the accessed field, and that we use the full context E ,
instead of the evaluation context Ev, to refer to field accesses everywhere in the expression e.
I Theorem 4 (Subject Reduction). if Σσ0 ; ∅ ` e0 : T0, σ0|e0 → σ1|e1, OK(σ0, e0) and
fieldGuarded(σ0, e0) then Σσ1 ; ∅ ` e1 : T1, OK (σ1, e1) and fieldGuarded(σ1, e1)
I Theorem 5. Progress + Subject Reduction ⇒ Stronger Soundness
Proof. This proof proceeds by induction in the usual manner.
Base case: At the start of execution, memory only contains c: since c is defined to always
be valid, and has only mut fields, it is trivially wellEncapsulated, thus OK (c 7→ Cap, e).
Induction: By Progress, we always have another evaluation step to take, by Subject Reduction
such a step will preserve OK , and so by induction, OK holds after any number of steps.
Note how for the proof garbage collectability is important: when the invariant() method
evaluates to false, execution can continue only if the offending object is classified as garbage.
Exposer Instrumentation
We first introduce a lemma derived from our well formedness criteria and the type system:
I Lemma 1 (Exposer Instrumentation). If σ0|e0 → σ1|e1 and fieldGuarded(σ0, e0)
then fieldGuarded(σ1, e1).
Proof. The only rule that can introduce a new field access is mcall. In that case,
Exposer Instrumentation holds by well formedness (all field accesses in methods are of the
form this.f), since mcall inserts a monitor while invoking capsule mutator methods, and
not field accesses themselves. If however the method is not a mut method but still accesses a
capsule field, by Mut Field such a field access expression cannot be typed as mut and so no
monitor is needed.
Note that monitor exit is fine because monitors are removed only when e1 is a value.
Proof of Subject Reduction
Any reduction step can be obtained by exactly one application of the ctxv rule and one
other rule. Thus the proof can simply proceed by cases on the other applied rule.
By Subject Reduction Base and Exposer Instrumentation, Σσ1 ; ∅ ` e1 : T1 and fieldGuarded(σ1, e1).
So we just need to proceed by cases on the reduction rule applied to verify that OK (σ1, e1)
holds:
1. (update) σ|l.f = v → σ′|e′:
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By update e′ = M(l;l;l).invariant()), thus monitored(e, l).
Every l1 such that l ∈ rog(σ, l1) will verify the same case as the former step:
If it was garbage, clearly it still is.
If it was monitored, it still is.
Otherwise it was valid and wellEncapsulated:
∗ If l ∈ erog(σ, l1) we have a contradiction since mutatable(l, σ, e), (by Mut Field)
∗ Otherwise, by our well formedess criteria that invariant only accesses imm and
capsule fields, and by Determinism, it is clearly the case that valid still holds;
By Head Not Circular it cannot be the case that l ∈ erog(σ′, l1), and so l1 is still
wellEncapsulated.
Every other l0 is not in the reachable object graph of l, thus it being OK could not
have been effected by this reduction step.
2. (access) σ|l.f → σ|v:
If l was valid and wellEncapsulated:
If we have now broken wellEncapsulated, we must have made something in its
erog mutatable. As we can only type capsule fields as mut and not imm fields,
by Mut Field we must have that f is capsule and l.f is being typed as mut. By
fieldGuarded(σ0, e0), the former step must have been inside a monitor M(l;Ev[l.f ];e)
and the l under reduction was the only occurrence of l. Since f is a capsule, we
know that l /∈ erog(σ, l) by Head Not Circular. Thus in our new step l is notinside
Ev[v]. Thus l must be monitored and hence it is OK .
Otherwise, l is still OK
Suppose some other l0 was wellEncapsulated and valid:
If l was in the rog of l0, by Capsule Tree, if l was in the rog of l, then v can only
be reached from l0 by passing through l, and so we could not have made l0 non
wellEncapsulated. In addition, since only things in the erog can be referenced by
invariant, validity can not depend on l, and by Determinism it is still the case that
l0 is valid. And so we can’t have effected l0 being OK .
Otherwise, this reduction step could not have affected l0, so l0 is still OK .
Nothing that was garbage could have been made reachable by this expression, since
the only value we produced was v and it was reachable through l (and so could not
have been garbage), thus l is still OK .
As we don’t change any monitors here, nothing that was monitored could have been
made un-monitored, and so it is still OK .
3. (mcall, try enter and try ok):
These reduction steps do not modify memory, the memory locations reachable inside
of main expression, or any monitor expressions. Therefore it cannot have any effect on
the garbage, wellEncapsulated, valid (due to Determinism), or monitored properties of any
memory locations, thus OK still holds.
4. (new) σ|new C(v)→ σ, l 7→ C{v}|M(l;l;l.invariant()):
Clearly the newly created object, l, is monitored. As for mcall, other objects and
properties are not disturbed, and so OK still holds.
5. (monitor exit) σ|M(l;v;true)→ σ|v:
As monitor expressions are not present in the original source code, it must have been
introduced by update, mcall, or new. In each case the 3rd expression started of as
l.invariant(), and it has now (eventually) been reduced to true, thus by Determinism l is
valid.
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If the monitor was introduced by update, then v = l. We must have had that l
was well encapsulated before update was executed (since it can’t have been garbage
and monitored, as update itself preserves this property and we haven’t modified
memory in anyway, we must still have that l is wellEncapsulated. As l is valid and
wellEncapsulated, it is OK .
If the monitor was introduced by mcall, then it was due to calling a capsule mutator
method that mutated a field f .
A location that was garbage obviously still is, and so is also OK .
No location that was valid could have been made invalid since this reduction rule
performs no mutation of memory. If a location was wellEncapsulated before, the
only way it could be non wellEncapsulated is if we somehow leaked a mut reference
to something, but by our well-formedness rules, v cannot be typed as mut and so
we can’t have affected wellEncapsulated, hence such thing is still OK .
The only location that could have been made un monitored is l itself. By our well
formedness criteria, l was only used to modify l.f , and we have no parameters
by which we could have made l.f non wellEncapsulated, since that would violate
Capsule Tree. As nothing else in l was modified, and it must have been wellEn-
capsulated before the mcall, and so it still is. In addition since l is valid, it is
OK .
Otherwise the monitor was introduced by new. Since we require that capsule fields
and imm fields are only initialised to capsule and imm expressions, by Capsule Tree, the
resulting value, l, must be wellEncapsulated, since l is also valid we have that l is OK .
6. (try error) σ, σ0|tryσ{error} catch {e}→ σ|e:
By Strong Exception Safety, we know that σ0 is garbage with respect to Ev[e]. By our well
formedness criteria, no location inside σ could have been monitored. Since we don’t modify
memory, everything in σ0 is garbage and nothing inside σ was previously monitored, it is
still clearly the case that everything in σ is OK .
B The Hamster Example in Spec#
In this section we describe exactly why we chose to annotate the example from Section 1
in the way we did. For brevity, we will assume the default accessibility is public, whilst in
both Spec# and C#, it is actually private.
The Point Class
The typical way of writing a Point class in C# is as follows:
class Point {
double x, y;
Point(double x, double y) { this.x = x; this.y = y; }
}
This works exactly as is in Spec#, however we have difficulty if we want to define equality
of Points (see below).
The Hamster Class
The Hamster class in C# would simply be:
class Hamster {
Point pos;
Hamster(Point pos) { this.pos = pos; }
}
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Though this is legal in Spec#, it is practically useless. Spec# has no way of knowing
whether pos is valid or consistent. If pos is not known to be valid, one will be unable to
pass it to almost any method, since by default methods implicitly require their receivers
and arguments to be valid (compare this with our invariant protocol, which guarantees that
any reachable object is valid). If pos is not known to be consistent, one will be unable to
mutate it, by updating one of its fields or by passing it as an argument (or receiver) to a non
Pure method. Though we don’t want pos to ever mutate, Spec# currently has no way of
enforcing that an instance of a non immutable class is itself immutable23, as such we will
simply refrain from mutating it.
To enable Spec# to reason about pos’s validity, we will require that it be a peer of the
enclosing Hamster; we can do this by annotating pos with [Peer]. Peers are objects that
have the same owner, implying that whenever one is valid and/or consistent, the other one
also is. This means that if we have a Hamster, we can use its pos, in the same ways as we
could use the Hamster.
To simplify instantiation of Hamsters, their constructors will take unowned Points, Spec#
will then automatically make such Point a peer. This is achieved by taking a [Captured]
Point in the constructor (note how similar this is to taking a capsule Point). Note that
unlike our system, this prevents multiple Hamsters from sharing the same Point, unless both
Hamsters have the same owner, if Point were immutable, there would be no such restriction.
With the aforementioned modifications, the Hamster becomes:
class Hamster {
[Peer] Point pos;
Hamster ([ Captured] Point pos) { this.pos = pos; }
}
We don’t want Point to be an immutable/value type, however if it were, the original
unannotated version would not have any problems.
The Cage Class
The natural way to write this class in C#, if it had native support for class invariants like
Spec#, would be:
class Cage {
Hamster h;
List <Point > path;
Cage(Hamster h, List <Point > path){this.h=h; this.path=path;}
invariant this.path.Contains(this.h.pos);
void Move() {
int index = this.path.IndexOf(this.h.pos);
this.h.pos = this.path[index % this.path.Count ]; }
}
However for the above invariant to be admissible in Spec#, this.path and this.h
must both be owned by this. In addition, the elements of this.path need to be owned
by this, since this.path.Conatains will read them. Note that this.h.pos also needs
23There is a the describes a simple solution to this problem: assign ownership of the object to a special
predefined ‘freezer’ object, which never gives up mutation permission [47], however this does not appear
to have been implemented; this would provide similar flexibility to the TM system we use, which allows
an initially mutable object to be promoted to immutable.
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to be owned by this, however since pos is declared as [Peer], if this owns this.h, it
also owns this.h.pos. To fix the invariant, we will declare h, path, and the elements of
path as reps (i.e. they are owned by the containing object). Finally, since Move modifies
this.h, this.h needs to be made consistent, which requires that the owner (this) be made
invalid; this can be achieved by using an expose(this) statement. expose(this){body}
marks this as invalid, executes body, checks that the invariant of this holds, and then
marks this valid again. As we did with the Hamster, we will simply take unowned h and
path values, however we also need the elements of path to be unowned; since Spec# has
no [ElementsCaptured] annotation, we will require path to be unowned, and its elements
(denoted by Owner.ElementProxy(path)) to be owned by the same owner as path (which
is null).
class Cage {
[Rep] public Hamster h;
[Rep , ElementsRep] List <Point > path;
Cage([ Captured] Hamster h, [Captured] List <Point > path)
requires Owner.Same(Owner.ElementProxy(path), path);
{ this.h = h; this.path = path; }
invariant this.path.Contains(this.h.pos);
void Move() {
int index = this.path.IndexOf(this.h.pos);
expose(this){this.h.pos=this.path[index%this.path.Count ]; }}
}
The above constructor now fails to verify, since Boogie is unconvinced that its precondition
actually holds when we initialise this.path. This is because the constructor for Object (the
default base class if none is provided) is not marked as [Pure]; since it is (implicitly) called
upon entry to Cage’s constructor, Boogie has no idea as to what memory could’ve mutated,
and so it doesn’t know whether the precondition still holds. The solution is to explicitly call
it, but at the end of the constructor: {this.h = h; this.path = path; base();}.
The above Cage code however does not work, since List operations, such as Contains
and IndexOf, will call the virtual Object.Equals method to compute equality of Points.
However Object.Equals implements reference equality, whereas we want value equality.
Defining Equality of Points
The obvious solution in C# is to just override Object.Equals accordingly, and let dynamic
dispatch handle the rest:
class Point {
.. // as before
override bool Equals(Object? o) {
Point? that = o as Point;
return that!=null && this.x == that.x && this.y == that.y;}
}
However this fails in Spec# since Object.Equals is annotated with [Pure]
[Reads(ReadsAttribute.Reads.Nothing)], and of course every overload of it must also
satisfy this. The Reads annotations specifies that the method cannot read fields of any
object, not even the receiver, this makes overloading the method useless.
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We resorted to making our own Equal method. Since it is called in Cage’s invariant,
Spec# requires it to be annotated as [Pure], and either annotated with
[Reads(ReadsAttribute.Reads.Nothing)] or [Reads(ReadsAttribute.Reads.Owned)]
(the default, if the method is [Pure]). The latter annotation means it can only read fields
of objects owned by the receiver of the method, so a [Pure] bool Equal(Point that)
method can read the fields of this, but not the fields of that. Of course this would make
the method unusable in Cage since the Points we are comparing equality against do not
own each other. As such, the simplest solution is to pass the fields of the other point to the
method:
[Pure] bool Equal(double x, double y) {
return x == this.x && y == this.y;}
Sadly however this mean we can no longer use List’s Contains and IndexOf methods,
rather we have to expand out their code manually; making these changes takes us to the
version we presented in Section 1.
C More Case Studies
Family
The following test case was designed to produce a worst case in the number of invariant
checks. We have a Family that (indirectly) contains a list of parents and children. The
parents and children are of type Person. Both Family and Person have an invariant, the
invariant of Family depends on its contained Persons.
class Person {
final String name;
Int daysLived;
final Int birthday;
Person(String name , Int daysLived , Int birthday) { .. }
mut method Void processDay(Int dayOfYear) {
this.daysLived += 1;
if (this.birthday == dayOfYear) {
Console.print("Happy birthday " + this.name + "!"); }}
read method Bool invariant () {
return !this.name.equals("") && this.daysLived >= 0 &&
this.birthday >= 0 && this.birthday < 365; }
}
class Family {
static class Box {
mut List <Person > parents;
mut List <Person > children;
Box(mut List <Person > parents , mut List <Person > children ){..}
mut method Void processDay(Int dayOfYear) {
for(Person c : this.children) { c.processDay(dayOfYear ); }
for(Person p : this.parents) { p.processDay(dayOfYear ); }}
}
capsule Box box;
Family(capsule List <Person > ps,capsule List <Person > cs) {
this.box = new Box(ps, cs); }
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mut method Void processDay(Int dayOfYear) {
this.box.processDay(dayOfYear ); }
mut method Void addChild(capsule Person child) {
this.box.children.add(child ); }
read method Bool invariant () {
for (Person p : this.box.parents) {
for (Person c : this.box.children) {
if (p.daysLived <= c.daysLived) {
return false; }}}
return true; }
}
Note how we created a Box class to hold the parents and children. Thanks to this pattern,
the invariant only needs to hold at the end of Family.processDay, after all the parents
and children have been updated. Thus Family.processDay is atomic: it updates all its
contained Persons together. Had we instead made the parents and children capsule
fields of Family, the invariant would be required to also hold between modifying the two
lists. This could cause problems if, for example, a child was updated before their parent.
We have a simple test case that calls processDay on a Family 1,095 (3× 365) times.
// 2 parents (one 32, the other 34), and no children
var fam = new Family(List.of(new Person("Bob", 11720 , 40),
new Person("Alice", 12497 , 87)), List.of());
for (Int day = 0; day < 365; day++) { // Run for 1 year
fam.processDay(day);
}
for (Int day = 0; day < 365; day++) { // The next year
fam.processDay(day);
if (day == 45) {
fam.addChild(new Person("Tim", 0, day)); }}
for (Int day = 0; r < 365; day++) { // The 3rd year
fam.processDay(day);
if (day == 340) {
fam.addChild(new Person("Diana", 0, day)); }}
The idea is that everything we do with the Family is a mutation; the fam.processDay
calls also mutate the contained Persons.
This is a worst case scenario for our approach compared to visible state semantics since it
reduces our advantages: our approach avoids invariant checks when objects are not mutated
but in this example most operations are mutations; similarly, our approach prevents the
exponential explosion of nested invariant checks24 when deep object graphs are involved, but
in this example the object graph of fam is very shallow.
We ran this test case using several different languages: L42 (using our protocol) performs
4,000 checks, D and Eiffel perform 7,995, and finally, Spec# performs only 1,104.
24As happened in our GUI case study, see Section 7.
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Our protocol performs a single invariant check at the end of each constructor, processDay
and addChild call (for both Person and Family).
The visible state semantics of both D and Eiffel perform additional invariant checks at
the beginning of each call to processDay and addChild.
The results for Spec# are very interesting, since it performs less checks than L42. This
is the case since processDay in Person just does a simple field update, which in Spec#
do not invoke runtime invariant checks. Instead, Spec# tries to statically verify that the
update cannot break the invariant; if it is unable to verify this, it requires that the update
be wrapped in an expose block.
Spec# relies on the absence of arithmetic overflow, and performs runtime checks to ensure
this25, as such the verifier concludes that the field increment in processDay cannot break
the invariant. Spec# is able to avoid some invariant checks in this case by relying on all
arithmetic operations performing runtime overflow checks; whereas integer arithmetic in L42
has the common wrap around semantics.
The annotations we had to add in the Spec# version26 were similar to our previous
examples, however since the fields of Person all have immutable classes/types, we only needed
to add the invariant itself. The Family class was similar to our Cage example (see section 1),
however in order to implement the addChild method we were forced to do a shallow clone
of the new child (this also caused a couple of extra runtime invariant checks). Unlike L42
however, we did not need to create a box to hold the parents and children fields, instead
we wrapped the body of the Family.processDay method in an expose (this) block. In
total we needed 16 annotations, worth a total of 45 tokens, this is worse than the code
following our approach that we showed above, which has 14 annotations and 14 tokens.
Spec# Papers
Their are many published papers about the pack/unpack methodology used by Spec#. To
compare against their expressiveness we will consider the three mains ones that introduced
their methodology and extensions:
Verification of Object-Oriented Programs with Invariants: [5] this paper introduces their
methodology. In their examples section (pages 41–47), they show how their methodology
would work in a class heirarchy with Reader and ArrayReader classes. The former
represents something that reads characters, whereas the latter is a concrete implementation
that reads from an owned array. They extend this further with a Lexer that owns a
Reader, which it uses to read characters and parse them into tokens. They also show an
example of a FileList class that owns an array of filenames, and a DirFileList class
that extends it with a stronger invariant. All of these examples can be represented in
L4227. The most interesting considerations are as follow:
Their ArrayReader class has a relinquishReadermethod that ‘unpacks’ the ArrayReader
and returns its owned array. The returned array can then be freely mutated and
passed around by other code. However, afterwards the ArrayReader will be ‘invalid’,
and so one can only call methods on it that do not require its invariant to hold.
However, it may later be ‘packed’ again (after its invariant is checked). In contrast, our
approach requires the invariant of all usable objects to hold. We can still relinquish the
array, but at the cost of making the ArrayReader forever unreachable. This can be
done by declaring relinquishReader as a capsule method, this works since our type
25Runtime checks are enabled by a compilation option; when they fail, unchecked exceptions are thrown.
26The Spec# code is in the artifact.
27Our encodings are in the artifact.
Isaac O. G., M. Servetto, and A. Potanin 23:41
modifier system guarantees that the receiver of such a method is not aliased, and hence
cannot be used again. Note that Spec# itself cannot represent the relinquishReader
method at all, since it does not provide explicit pack and unpack operations, rather its
expose statement performs both an unpack and a pack, thus we cannot unpack an
ArrayReader without repacking it in the same method.
Their DirFileList example inherits from a FileList which has an invariant, and a
final method, this is something their approach was specifically designed to handle. As
L42 does not have traditional subclassing, we are unable to express this concept fully,
but L42 does have code reuse via trait composition, in which case DirFileList can
essentially copy and paste the methods from FileList, and they will automatically
enforce the invariant of DirFileList.
Object Invariants in Dynamic Contexts: [46] this paper shows how one can specify an
invariant for a doubly linked list of ints (which is an immutable value type). Unlike our
protocol however, it allows the invariant of Node to refer to sibling Nodes which are not
owned/encapsulated by itself, but rather the enclosing List. Our protocol can verify
such a linked list28 (since its elements are immutable), however we have to specify the
invariant inside the List class. We do not see this as a problem, as the Node type is only
supposed to be used as part of a List, thus this restriction does not impact users of List.
Friends Need a Bit More: Maintaining Invariants Over Shared State: [6] this paper shows
how one can verify invariants over interacting objects, where neither owns/contains the
other. They have multiple examples which utilise the ‘subject/observer’ pattern, where a
‘subject’ has some state that an ‘observer’ wants to keep track of. In their Subject/View
example, Views are created with references to Subjects, and copies of their state. When
a Subject’s state is modified, it calls a method on its attached Views, notifying them
of this update. The invariant is that a View’s copy of its Subject’s state is up to date.
Their Master/Clock example is similar, a Clock contains a reference to a Master, and
saves a copy of the Master’s time. The Master has a Tick method that increases its
time, but unlike the Subject/View example, the Clock is not notified. The invariant is
that the Clock’s time is never ahead of its Master’s. Our protocol is unable to verify
these interactions, because the interacting objects are not immutable or encapsulated by
each other.
28Our protocol allows for encoding this example, but to express the invariant we would need to use
reference equality, which the L42 language does not support.
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